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Abstract
We build a model of investment and financing decisions to study the choice between bonds
and bank loans in a firm’s marginal financing decision and its effects on corporate investment.
We show that firms with more growth options, higher bargaining power in default, operating
in more competitive product markets, and facing lower credit supply are more likely to issue
bonds. We also demonstrate that, by changing the cost of financing, these characteristics affect
the timing of investment. We test these predictions using a sample of U.S. firms and present
new evidence that supports our theory.
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In the frictionless financial markets of Modigliani and Miller (1958), capital structure is irrel-
evant and all value enhancing projects can be financed. The insight that market frictions make
financing decisions relevant has spawned a large body of theoretical and empirical research, most of
which focuses on the choice between equity and debt. In this paper, we examine a related but much
less studied topic, namely the choice between bonds and bank loans and its relation to corporate
investment. To this end, we build a model of investment and financing decisions in which firms
can choose not only the amount but also the type of debt to issue. We then examine whether the
predictions of the model are supported by the data on firms’ debt choices and investment decisions.
We base our analysis on a simple real options model in the spirit of Sundaresan and Wang (2007)
or Morellec and Schu¨rhoff (2010), in which investment and financing decisions are endogenously
and jointly determined. Specifically, we consider a firm with assets in place and a growth option
to expand operations. The firm is initially financed with common equity and has the possibility
to exercise its growth option at any time. To finance the cost of investment, the firm can issue a
mixture of equity and debt. While real options models generally assume that firms have access to
a single class of debt, we consider instead that firms can finance investment using any combination
of common stock, bonds, and bank loans. Our paper addresses a set of key questions in corporate
finance. First, how do debt choice and capital structure (i.e. the firm’s leverage ratio) interact
and what are the factors that drive these interactions? Second, how do debt choice and capital
structure affect investment policy? Third, how do they depend on firm characteristics?
In the model, corporate income is subject to taxation, leading to a role for debt financing. The
benefits and costs of each debt source affect not only the mix of debt that borrowers demand but also
corporate investment. Our theory assumes that bank loans are renegotiable so that borrowing from
private lenders makes inefficient liquidations less likely and, therefore, reduces the cost of capital.
However, the supply of private lenders with the required expertise is limited. Notably, one key
innovation of our model is to consider that firms have to search for informed lenders when seeking
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to raise private debt, leading to financing risk and to rent extraction by private lenders. Based on
these assumptions, the model characterizes the value-maximizing investment and financing policies
for a firm acting in the best interests of shareholders and generates a rich set of testable predictions
about the choice between bonds and bank loans and corporate investment.
We highlight the main empirical implications. First, our theory predicts that firms with valuable
investment opportunities are more likely to finance investment with equity and bonds. Indeed, for
such firms the hold up or rent extraction problem associated with borrowing from a private lender
is particularly acute and the relative cost of private debt particularly high. Second, because bank
loans are renegotiable, our model predicts that firms with lower bargaining power of shareholders
in default have a preference for bank loans. Indeed, smaller deviations from absolute priority in
default make renegotiable debt relatively less expensive and bank loans more attractive.
We also incorporate in our analysis several realistic factors that affect the choice between bonds
and bank loans. The first such factor is the supply of capital in private credit markets. We
show that credit supply has two effects on the public-private debt choice. First, it determines the
likelihood of finding informed private lenders. Second, it determines their bargaining power at the
time of financing and, therefore, the cost of bank loans. In particular, greater competition among
financiers reduces the share of the investment surplus captured by private lenders. Therefore, a
stronger supply of credit tends to push the choice of debt instrument towards bank loans.
The second factor is competition in the firm’s product markets. Specifically, we consider that
competitors can implement projects that will make the firm’s growth option worthless and show
that this risk affects the choice of debt source. Notably, as product market competition increases,
the financing risk associated with bank loans increases and firms tend to favor public debt issues.
We also explore with our model how corporate investment depends on the firm and industry
characteristics that determine the choice between bonds and bank loans. We find that, by changing
the firm’s debt structure and its cost of capital, these characteristics affect the attractiveness of
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growth options and the timing of investment. Notably, the profitability of growth options, product
market competition, and private credit supply speed up investment, while the bargaining power of
shareholders in default and liquidation costs delay investment.
To test the predictions of the model, we form a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 1988-
2007. For this sample, we estimate logit models predicting the likelihood that a firm chooses bonds
over bank loans. Our estimations reveal that debt choices are related to these explanatory variables
in ways consistent with our theory. Notably, we find that the bargaining power of shareholders in
default and the intensity of product market competition increase the likelihood of issuing public
debt. We also find that firms with substantial growth opportunities are more likely to issue bonds.
By contrast, firms facing a stronger credit supply are more likely to issue bank loans. The results
are robust to the use of alternative proxies and to the inclusion of additional control variables.
In the second step, we identify the effects of our explanatory variables on investment rates.
Specifically, we follow Whited (2006) and estimate a proportional hazard model in which we inves-
tigate which factors increase or decrease a firm’s investment hazard. Our estimations show that
growth options, credit supply, and competition shift investment hazard rates up, while liquida-
tion costs and bargaining power in default shift hazard rates down, consistent with the model’s
predictions. We also perform several robustness tests that confirm the validity of our results.
The present paper continues a line of research that uses structural models to analyze corporate
policy choices. While early studies in this literature focus either on investment or on financing
decisions,1 a number of recent papers examine the relation between a firm’s investment opportunity
set and its capital structure, emphasizing the role of agency conflicts in the debt-equity choice.2
1See McDonald and Siegel (1985) and Leland (1994) for early contributions and Strebulaev and Whited (2012)
for a review of this literature. With the exception of Hackbarth, Hennessy, and Leland (2007), that abstracts from
investment decisions, financing frictions, and product market competition, these papers do not analyze the choice
between public and private debt financing, which is the focus of our analysis.
2Mello and Parsons (1992) and Mauer and Triantis (1994) are the first to examine the interactions of investment
and financing decisions in dynamic settings. Hennessy (2004) uses Q-theory to show that these interactions matter
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Among these, our work is most closely related to a set of papers that study the effects of security
provisions (see Morellec, 2001, and Auh and Sundaresan, 2013) or priority structure (see Sundaresan
and Wang, 2007, and Hackbarth and Mauer, 2012) on investment and financing decisions. To the
best of our knowledge, however, our paper is the first that models both endogenous investment
and capital structure together with the choice between bonds and bank loans. This allows us to
generate additional insights and empirical predictions. Another key difference between our setup
and prior contributions is the introduction of search frictions for the use of private debt. We believe
that our modeling approach could be used in various other real options applications.
Second, our paper relates to the empirical literature investigating the choice between public
and private debt (see Blackwell and Kidwell, 1988, Houston and James, 1996, Johnson, 1997, Kr-
ishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam, 1999, Colla, Ippolito, and Li, 2012, or Lin, Ma, Malatesta,
and Xuan, 2013). Our paper extends this literature in several ways. First, we use an incremental
approach that analyzes the determinants of debt issues instead of focusing on the composition of a
firm’s debt financing at one point in time (see also Denis and Mihov, 2003, or Gomes and Phillips,
2012). This allows us to relate financing choices to explanatory variables measured just before the
financing decision. Second, we provide direct evidence on the role of growth options, bargaining
power of shareholders in default, credit supply, and competition in the choice of debt source. Third,
we show that the determinants of the choice of debt source also affect investment rates.
Lastly, our paper relates to the study of Rajan (1992), which is the first to emphasize that while
private debt can avoid inefficient liquidations, it can also lead to rent extraction. Our analysis
empirically. Sundaresan and Wang (2007) and Tserlukevich (2008) propose models in which firms can issue debt to
exercise a sequence of growth options. Leland (1998) studies the relation between agency costs, risk management, and
dynamic capital structure choice. Chen, Miao, and Wang (2010) derive utility-maximizing investment and financing
policies for risk-averse entrepreneurs. Chen and Manso (2010) examine the effects of macroeconomic fluctuations on
the agency costs of debt. Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) study the relation between the priority structure of corporate
debt and investment decisions. Morellec and Schu¨rhoff (2010, 2011) examine the effects of personal taxation and
asymmetric information on the timing of investment and the choice between debt and equity financing.
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incorporates additional determinants of debt choices, and relates debt choice to capital structure
and corporate investment. This allows us to generate a rich set of empirical predictions that we
test on a large sample of U.S. firms.
1. Model and assumptions
Throughout the paper, assets are continuously traded in complete and arbitrage-free markets. The
default-free term structure is flat with an after-tax risk-free rate r, at which investors may lend and
borrow freely. Corporate taxes are paid at a constant rate τ and full offsets of corporate losses are
allowed. We consider an infinitely-lived firm with assets in place and a growth option to expand
operations. Assets in place generate a continuous flow of operating income Xt as long as the firm
is in operation, where (Xt)t≥0 is governed by the process:
dXt = µXtdt+ σXtdWt, X0 = x > 0.
under the risk neutral probability measure Q. In this equation, µ < r and σ > 0 are constant
parameters and W = (Wt)t≥0 is a standard Q−Brownian motion. The firm can exercise its growth
option by paying the constant investment cost I. Immediately upon exercise, operating income
increases from X to piX, where pi > 1 is a constant factor that determines the growth potential of
the firm. The firm has flexibility in the timing of investment but it can be preempted by potential
competitors if it does not invest promptly. Specifically, we assume that over each time interval
[t, t+ dt] before investment there is a probability λdt that the firm loses its growth option, as in
Morellec and Schu¨rhoff (2011) or Hackbarth, Mathews, and Robinson (2012).
The firm is initially financed with equity.3 To finance investment, it can issue a mixture of debt
and equity at the investment date. We consider that the firm has access to two classes of perpetual
3Extending the set-up to incorporate a mix of debt and equity does not change our results and empirical predictions.
Indeed, if new debt is senior to existing debt, then investment does not affect the value of old debtholders and new
debt is priced as in the current model (see Johnson and Stulz, 1985, and in Hackbarth and Mauer, 2012). If instead
new debt has lower priority than existing debt, then there is debt overhang and investment is delayed by existing
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debt contracts: private debt contracts (i.e. bank loans) with coupon payment b and public debt
contracts (i.e bonds) with coupon payment c.
Because cash flows fluctuate stochastically, debt contracts are subject to default risk. In default,
private debt contracts can be renegotiated to avoid liquidation. We assume however that private
lenders with the required expertise are scarce and that, conditional on searching, the probability of
getting financing from informed private creditors over each time interval [t, t+ dt] is δdt.4 We also
assume that firms incur a flow cost φ > 0 when searching for private creditors and that, because of
their scarcity, these creditors can capture part of the investment surplus at the time of financing.5
As in Rajan (1992), our theory therefore assumes that intermediaries reorganize more efficiently
than public (arm’s length) investors. This superior ability of private investors allows them to extract
rents from borrowing firms. In our model, the source of these rents can be traced to the scarcity of
informed lenders, which gives them bargaining power at the time of debt issuance. Specifically, once
management and informed debt investors meet, they bargain to determine the proceeds from the
debt issue or, equivalently, the allocation of the investment surplus (NPV) between shareholders
and private lenders. Given a non-negative surplus S (X; b, c), we assume that the allocation of this
surplus results from Nash bargaining. Denoting the bargaining power of shareholders by θ = δρ+δ ,
where ρ ≥ 0, the amount ω∗ that private lenders can extract satisfies
ω∗ = argmax
ω≥0
ω1−θ [S(X; b, c)− ω]θ = (1− θ)S(X; b, c).
When ρ = 0, we have θ = 1 and shareholders capture all the investment surplus. When ρ > 0, the
debt. However, because the firm invests when the cash flow shock is high, the risk of corporate debt is low at the
time of investment and the effect of debt overhang on debt choices and corporate investment is limited.
4One potentially aggravating factor is that the firm may not be able to find informed private creditors with deep
pockets and, thus, may have to rely on a group of private debt investors as in He and Xiong (2011).
5In the Appendix, we consider an alternative framework in which firms have access to credit lines. In this case,
there are no search frictions. However, because the rate on the credit line is set ex-ante by the bank and may not
reflect the financial health of the firm at the time of investment, debt will be mispriced leading to distortions in
investment policy. Most of our results go through in this alternative formulation. See section 2.4 below.
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fraction of the surplus captured by shareholders increases with the supply of informed lending δ.
That is, competition among informed lenders reduces their ability to extract rents.
Our assumptions imply that the supply of bank loans has two effects on debt choice. First, it
affects the likelihood of finding informed private lenders. Second, it affects their bargaining power
at the time of issuance, and therefore, the cost of private debt. The paper does not attach any
particular interpretation to the uncertainty in the supply of informed lenders. It may be related to
shocks to banks health (as in Gan, 2007), to regulatory changes (as in Leary, 2009, Lemmon and
Roberts, 2010, or Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig, 2010), to the limited ability of financial intermedi-
aries to verify the viability of projects (as in Faulkender and Petersen, 2006), or to variations in
monetary policy (as in Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox, 1993, or Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein, 1994).
Instead of issuing private debt, the firm can choose to issue public debt. As in Bulow and Shoven
(1979) and Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), public debt contracts are not renegotiable. Therefore,
public debt does not require any specific expertise and, hence, is not subject to search frictions.6
We assume however that public debt is subject to proportional issuance costs ι.7
There is recent empirical and anecdotal evidence supporting the way that we model the frictions
in the private credit market and how it affects debt choice. For instance, Becker and Ivashina (2012)
provide evidence suggesting that firms switch from loan to bond financing at times characterized
by tight lending standards. Moreover, syndicated bank loan lending has significantly fallen in the
Euro zone during the sovereign debt crisis as companies have struggled to find informed private
creditors willing to provide credit. As a result, these firms have shifted towards bond issues, leading
to a significant boom in the European corporate bond market.8
6Allowing public debtholders to extract part of the investment surplus would not affect our results since the
value-matching condition (4) implies that there is no surplus at the time of investment with public debt.
7Blackwell and Kidwell (1988) and Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam (1999) provide evidence that issuance
costs are larger for public debt issues than for private issues.
8See, for example, Financial Times, December 2, 2012, ”Eurozone syndicated loans at 10-year low”, or August 14,
2012, ”Debt crisis sends European blue-chips to bonds”.
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After debt has been issued, the firm has the option to default on its debt obligations. If the firm
has issued public debt at the time of investment, then default leads to liquidation. At the time of
liquidation, the firm loses a fraction α ∈ (0, 1] of its capital stock, leading to a drop in operating cash
flows. That is, we consider that if the instant of liquidation is T , then XT = (1−α)XT− . If instead
the firm has issued private debt, then default leads to renegotiation. We consider a Nash bargaining
game in default that leads to a debt-equity swap, as in Fan and Sundaresan (2000). Denoting the
bargaining power of shareholders in default by η ∈ [0, 1], the Nash bargaining solution implies that
shareholders get a fraction ηα of asset value in default. We assume that renegotiations may fail
with probability q, as in Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) and Favara, Schroth, and Valta (2012).
Throughout the paper, management maximizes shareholder wealth when making policy choices.
For doing so, management selects (i) the firm’s investment policy, (ii) the firm’s financing structure
– type of debt contract and leverage level – at the investment date, and (iii) the firm’s default policy
after debt has been issued. Because the decision to invest is irreversible, the firm’s initial asset
structure remains fixed until the firm cash flows rise to a sufficiently high level and the manager
invests. Similarly, cash flows need to reach a sufficiently low level for the firm to default after
investment. We can thus see the manager’s policy choices as determining the coupon payment and
type of debt contract issued at the time of investment, the level of the cash flow shock at which it
is optimal to invest, and the level of the cash flow shock at which it is optimal to default.
2. Model solution and empirical predictions
2.1. Firm value after investment
We solve the model backwards, starting with the values of equity, private debt, and public debt after
investment. We denote equity value before investment by E1(X) and the values of equity, bank
debt, market debt, and the firm after investment by E2 (X; b, c), B(X; b), D (X; c), and V2 (X; b, c).
In our setup, the value of equity before investment equals the sum of the present value of the
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cash flows accruing to shareholders until investment and the change in this present value at the
time of investment. Since the firm can finance investment using equity and either private debt or
public debt, we need to consider two cases. Suppose first that the firm issues private debt at the
time of investment. In that case, shareholders get E2 (X; b, 0) − [I −B(X; b)] ≡ V2 (X; b, 0) − I
at the time of investment and the change in equity value is given by V2 (X; b, 0) − I − E1(X). If
instead the firm issues public debt, the change in equity value at the time of investment is given by
V2 (X; 0, c)− I− ιD(X; c)−E1(X) where ιD(X; c) represents issuance costs. We therefore start by
computing the value of the firm after investment net of issuance costs, i.e. V2 (X; b, c)− ιD(X; c).
The value of the firm after investment is given by the sum of the cash flows accruing to claimhold-
ers until default, i.e. the after-tax operating cash flow plus the tax savings, and the present value
of the cash flows accruing in default. Denote by Xi the default threshold selected by shareholders,
for i = B,D where i = B (respectively i = D) when the firm issues private (respectively public)
debt. Standard arguments imply that (see Appendix A):
V2 (X; b, c) = piΛX +
τ (c1i=D + b1i=B)
r
[
1−
(
X
Xi
)ν]
− α (1i=D + q1i=B)piΛXi
(
X
Xi
)ν
,
where 1i=A = 1 if i = A, ν < 0 is the negative root of the quadratic equation
1
2σ
2y(y− 1) +µy = r,
and the positive constant Λ is defined by
Λ =
1− τ
r − µ.
This equation shows that the value of the levered firm is equal to the value of the unlevered firm
(first term on the right hand side) plus the present value of the tax savings (second term) minus
expected bankruptcy costs (third term). When the firm issues private debt from informed lenders,
the probability of liquidation is reduced by a factor q and firm value is increased.
The default threshold that maximizes equity value depends on whether the firm has issued
public or private debt and is given by (see Appendix A):
X∗i =
ν
ν − 1
r − µ
pir
(
c1i=D +
b1i=B
1− (1− q) ηα
)
, (1)
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and the value-maximizing coupon payments for public and private debt respectively satisfy:
c∗ = XΛpi
r (ν − 1)
ν (1− τ)
[
1− ν − ν (α+ ι (1− α)) 1− τ
τ − ι
]1/ν
,
b∗ = XΛpi
r (ν − 1)
ν(1− τ) [1− (1− q) ηα]
[
1− ν − ν (1− τ)αq
(1− (1− q) ηα) τ
]1/ν
.
As shown by these expressions, the value-maximizing coupon payment at the time of issuance
increases with the tax benefit of debt τ and decreases with bankruptcy and issuance costs α and ι.
Equation (1) also shows that when the firm issues private debt, shareholders can extract concessions
from debtholders in default, leading to early default in that X∗B > X
∗
D.
Plugging these expressions in the equation for firm value and taking into account the registration
costs associated with public debt contracts, we finally get the value of the levered firm at optimal
leverage net of registration costs as
V2 (X; b
∗, 0) = piΛX
{
1 +
τ (ν − 1)
ν(1− τ) [1− (1− q) ηα]
(
Θ−Θ1−ν)− αqΘ1−ν} ,
and
V2 (X; 0, c
∗)− ιD(X; c∗) = piΛX
{
1 +
(τ − ι) (ν − 1)
ν (1− τ)
(
Γ− Γ1−ν)− [α+ ι (1− α)] Γ1−ν} ,
where
Γ =
[
1− ν − ν (α+ ι (1− α)) 1− τ
τ − ι
]1/ν
and Θ =
[
1− ν − ν (1− τ)αq
(1− (1− q) ηα) τ
]1/ν
.
In our model, the benefits of bank loans over bonds are that renegotiation in default lowers
deadweight costs of financial distress and that there are no registration costs for bank loans. The
cost of private debt is that informed lenders are scarce and that the possibility to renegotiate
the debt contract in default leads to early default. Consistent with this tradeoff, these equations
show that when there are no successful renegotiations (i.e. q = 1) and no registration costs (i.e.
ι = 0), we have V2 (X; b
∗, 0) = V2 (X; 0, c∗). In addition, the value of the firm with private debt
V2 (X; b
∗, 0) decreases with renegotiation frictions q while the value of the firm with public debt
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V2 (X; 0, c
∗) decreases with registration costs ι. Therefore, whenever q < 1 or ι > 0, we have
V2 (X; 0, c
∗) < V2 (X; b∗, 0). That is, one implication of the model is that there would be no place
for public debt as long as the supply of bank debt was fully competitive (δ ↑ ∞).
2.2. Optimal investment and financing strategies
Prior to investment, management makes two types of decisions. First, it decides on the timing of
investment. Second, it decides on the financing of the capital expenditure. Since the value of the
firm after investment and the surplus from investment depend on the financing strategy of the firm,
the firm’s investment and financing decisions have to be jointly determined.
Denote by X
∗
B the level of the cash flow shock above which it is optimal to search for private
debt investors and invest in the project. (Note that in contrast to standard real options models,
investment may not occur at X
∗
B since the firm needs to find informed lenders.) In addition, denote
by X
∗
D the investment threshold when financing the capital expenditure with public debt. Since
firm value at the time of investment is greater when financing the project with private debt, we
have X
∗
B < X
∗
D. That is, the value-maximizing policy for shareholders is to refrain from investing
for X < X
∗
B, to invest and issue private debt for X ∈ [X∗B, X∗D) conditional on finding private debt
investors, and to invest and issue public debt at X
∗
D if no private debt investor has been found.
Suppose first that the cash flow shock is in the region [X
∗
B, X
∗
D) where it is optimal to issue
private debt at the time of investment. The total investment surplus is then given by:
S (X, b∗, 0) ≡ V2 (X, b∗, 0)− I − E1 (X) = ΦX − I − E1 (X)
where
Φ ≡ piΛ
{
1 +
τ (ν − 1)
ν(1− τ) [1− (1− q) ηα]
(
Θ−Θ1−ν)− αqΘ1−ν} > 0.
Before investment, the firm delivers a cash flow stream (1 − τ)X. In addition to this cash flow
stream, investors also get capital gains E [dE1] over each time interval [t, t+dt]. Using Itoˆ’s lemma,
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we then have that equity value before investment satisfies:
rE1 (X) = µXE
′
1 (X) +
σ2
2
X2E′′1 (X) + (1− τ)X
+λ [ΛX − E1 (X)] + 1X∈[X∗B ,X∗D) [δθ (ΦX − I − E1 (X))− φ] ,
where 1X∈[X∗B ,X∗D) = 1 if X ∈ [X
∗
B, X
∗
D).
The left hand side of this equation represents the required return for investing in the firm’s
equity per unit of time. The right hand side is the sum of the cash flow generated by the firm’s
assets and the expected change in equity value. This right hand side is similar to those derived
in standard contingent claims models (see e.g. Leland, 1994). However, it contains the additional
terms λ [ΛX − E1 (X)] and 1X∈[X∗B ,X∗D) [δθ (ΦX − I − E1 (X))− φ] that reflect the effects of com-
petition and credit supply uncertainty on equity value. The second of these terms is the product
of the arrival rate of an informed lender δ and the surplus that shareholders extract from invest-
ment net of search costs (θ (ΦX − I − E1 (X))− φ), conditional on searching for informed lenders
(1X∈[X∗B ,X∗D)). Similarly, the first of these terms is the product of the change in equity value when
a competitor invests (ΛX − E1 (X)) and the probability λ of such an event.
Equity value is solved subject to the following boundary conditions. First, since zero is an
absorbing barrier for the cash flow shock, it must be that E1(0) = 0. In that case, assets in
place do not produce any cash flows and the option to expand is worthless. Also, since cash flows
to claimholders are given by a (piecewise) continuous Borel-bounded function, the value function
E1 (·) is piecewise C2 (see Theorem 4.9 pp. 271 in Karatzas and Shreve, 1991). Therefore, equity
value satisfies the continuity and smoothness conditions:
lim
X↓X∗B
E1 (X) = lim
X↑X∗B
E1 (X) , and lim
X↓X∗B
E′1(X) = lim
X↑X∗B
E′1(X)
where derivatives are taken with respect to X.
In the model, the firm can finance the capital expenditure using equity and either private debt
or public debt. The value-maximizing threshold when investing with private debt satisfies the
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value-matching condition:9
E1(X
∗
B) = ΦX
∗
B − I.
As the cash flow shock increases it becomes more and more costly for the firm to wait for informed
lenders. This gives us two additional boundary conditions. First, the value of equity at the time
of investment when the firm finances the capital expenditure by issuing public debt satisfies the
value-matching condition:
E1 (X)|X=X∗D = V2(X
∗
D; 0, c
∗)− ιD(X∗I,D; c∗)− I = ΨX∗D − I, (4)
where
Ψ ≡ piΛ
{
1 +
(ν − 1) (τ − ι)
ν (1− τ)
(
Γ− Γ1−ν)− [α+ ι (1− α)] Γ1−ν} .
Second, to ensure that investment with public debt financing occurs along the optimal path, the
value of equity satisfies the smooth pasting condition:
∂E1 (X)
∂X
∣∣∣∣
X=X
∗
D
= Ψ. (5)
This leads to the following result (see Appendix B):
Proposition 1 The value of equity before investment is given by
E1 (X) =

AXξ + 1−τ+λΛr+λ−µ X, for X < X
∗
B,
CXβ +DXζ + 1−τ+λΛ+δθΦr+λ+δθ−µ X − δθI+φr+λ+δθ , for X ∈ [X
∗
B, X
∗
D),
where the investment thresholds with private and public debt X
∗
B and X
∗
D respectively satisfy
X
∗
B = z X
∗
D ,
and
X
∗
D =
ζ[(r+λ)I−φ](1−z−β)+ξ(r+λ+δθ)Iz−β
(ζ−β)(r+λ+δθ)
ζ−1
ζ−βΨ +
ζ−1
ζ−β
1−τ+λΛ+δθΦ
r+λ+δθ−µ (z
1−β − 1)− ζ−ξζ−βΦz1−β − ξ−1ζ−β 1−τ+λΛr+λ−µ z1−β
.
9This condition follows from the value matching condition of shareholders at X
∗
B . Optimality is ensured by the
continuity and smoothness conditions.
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where z < 1 is the solution to the non-linear equation
ζ [(r + λ) I − φ] (1− z−β)+ ξ (r + λ+ δθ) Iz−β
β [(r + λ) I − φ] (z−ζ − 1)− ξ (r + λ+ δθ) Iz−ζ
=
(ζ − 1)
[
Ψ + 1−τ+λΛ+δθΦr+λ+δθ−µ
(
z1−β − 1)]− (ζ − ξ) Φz1−β − (ξ − 1) 1−τ+λΛr+λ−µ z1−β
(1− β)
[
Ψ + 1−τ+λΛ+δθΦr+λ+δθ−µ (z
1−ζ − 1)
]
− (ξ − β) Φz1−ζ + (ξ − 1) 1−τ+λΛr+λ−µ z1−ζ
.
In these equations, the constants A, C, and D satisfy
A =
{[
Φ− 1− τ + λΛ
r + λ− µ
]
X
∗
B − I
}
(X
∗
B)
−ξ,
C =
{
ζ − 1
ζ − β
[
Ψ− 1− τ + λΛ + δθΦ
r + λ+ δθ − µ
]
X
∗
D −
ζ
ζ − β
(r + λ) I − φ
r + λ+ δθ
}
(X
∗
D)
−β,
D =
{
β − 1
β − ζ
[
Ψ− 1− τ + λΛ + δθΦ
r + λ+ δθ − µ
]
X
∗
D −
β
β − ζ
(r + λ) I − φ
r + λ+ δθ
}
(X
∗
D)
−ζ ,
and the constant elasticities ξ, β, and ζ are given by
ξ = (σ2/2− µ)/σ2 +
√
[((σ2/2− µ)/σ2]2 + 2 (r + λ) /σ2 > 1,
β = (σ2/2− µ)/σ2 −
√
[(σ2/2− µ)/σ2]2 + 2(r + λ+ δθ)/σ2 < 0,
ζ = (σ2/2− µ)/σ2 +
√
[(σ2/2− µ)/σ2]2 + 2(r + λ+ δθ)/σ2 > 1.
Equity value in Proposition 1 can be interpreted as follows. The first term on the right hand side
of equity value in the no-investment region (X < X
∗
B) represents the option value of investing in
the project and restructuring the firm’s capital structure. The second term represents the value of a
perpetual claim to the current flow of income. This second term captures the effects of competition
through the term λΛr+λ−µX, that reflects both the increase in the discount rate due to competition
and the value of the firm after a competitor has invested. Similarly, the first two terms on the right
hand side of equity value in the investment with private lending region (X
∗
B ≤ X < X∗D) represent
the change in the value of the firm if no private debt investor can be found before the cash flow
shock returns to the no–investment region (first term) or reaches the investment threshold with
public debt financing X
∗
D (second term). The third term represents the sum of the present value
of cash flows from assets in place and the increase in equity value due to investment with private
debt financing. The fourth term represents the present value of investment and search costs.
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When the expected delay associated with private debt financing (as measured by 1/δ) tends to
zero, the value-maximizing investment threshold converges to:
lim
δ↑∞
X
∗
B(δ) ≡ X∗∞ =
ξ
ξ − 1
I
Φ− Λ . (7)
Equation (7) for X
∗
∞ can also be written as:{
(pi − 1) + pi
[
τ
r (ν − 1)
ν(1− τ) [1− (1− q) ηα]
(
Θ−Θ1−ν)− αqΘ1−ν]}ΛX∗∞ = ξξ − 1 I .
The left-hand side of this equation represents the benefit from investment. At the time of in-
vestment, the firm (i) increases its operating cash flows (first term pi − 1 in the bracket) and (ii)
rebalances its capital structure (second term in the bracket). The right hand side of this equation
is the adjusted cost of investment. This cost reflects the option value of waiting through the factor
ξ
ξ−1 . When this option has no value (which is the case as λ tends to infinity), shareholders invest
as soon as the standard NPV is positive (i.e. as soon as X > IΦ−Λ).
2.3. Model predictions
The public-private debt choice. Since bank loans are renegotiable – and therefore less costly
– firms find it optimal to finance investment by issuing private debt if the supply of bank loans
is high enough and the pricing of private debt is competitive enough. To better understand the
economic determinants of firms’ financing decisions, Figure 1 plots the ratio of the investment
triggers z ≡ X
∗
B
X
∗
D
as a function of the arrival rate of informed lenders δ, the bargaining power of
shareholders in default η, the size of the growth option pi, liquidation costs α, and the arrival rate
of competitors λ. In this Figure, a low value for z implies that firms have a greater likelihood of
financing the capital expenditure with private debt (holding µ and σ constant).
Insert Figure 1 Here
In this Figure, the risk free rate is set to r = 5%. The risk-neutral growth rate and volatility of
the cash flow shock are set to µ = 0.67% and σ = 28.86%, in line with the estimates of Morellec,
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Nikolov, and Schu¨rhoff (2012). The tax advantage of debt captures corporate and personal taxes
and is set equal to τ = 15%. This corresponds to a tax environment in which the corporate tax
rate is set at 35% and the tax rates on dividends and interest income are set to 11.6% and 29.3%,
consistent with Graham (1996). We base the value of liquidation costs on the estimates of Glover
(2012) and set α = 45%. The size of the growth option is set to pi = 1.25 while the arrival rate of
competitors is set to λ = 1 so that the expected lifetime of the growth option is 1 year. We set
issuance costs to ι = 2%, in line with the estimates of Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) or Kim, Palia,
and Saunders (2008). Finally, we set δ = 3, implying an expected financing delay with private debt
of 1δ = 4 months, and ρ = 0.03, implying that 99% of the investment surplus goes to shareholders.
Figure 1 shows that as the supply of bank loans increases, the spread between the two thresholds
widens. Indeed, as δ increases, the present value of potential savings in default costs increases, the
pricing of private debt improves, and it becomes relatively less interesting to finance the capital
expenditure by issuing public debt. In addition, Figure 1 shows that an increase in the bargaining
power of shareholders in default increases the cost of bank loans and makes public debt more
attractive (i.e. z increases). Figure 1 also shows that as the growth option becomes more valuable
(i.e. as pi increases) and as competition intensifies (i.e. as λ increases), the wedge between the two
investment thresholds decreases, implying that firms become more likely to issue bonds.
Remark: In the model, bankruptcy costs have two opposite effects on the cost of private debt.
First, they increase the renegotiation surplus. Second, they induce early default, leading to a
combined effect that is difficult to sign (i.e. to a non-monotonic relation between α and z). By
contrast, an increase in the bargaining power of shareholders in default leads to an increase in
default risk and to an unambiguous increase in the cost of private debt. In the analysis below, we
therefore focus on measuring the effects of this factor on the choice between bonds and bank loans.
Corporate investment. In the model, the timing of investment is endogenous and investment
occurs the first time the cash flow process reaches the region [X
∗
B, X
∗
D) and the firm can find private
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debt investors or reaches X
∗
D before informed debt investors can be found. Table 1 examines the
determinants of investment hazards, defined as the probability of undertaking the project as a
function of time. To do so, we simulate a panel of N = 237, 400 firms using a procedure described
in the Appendix. Given the grouped data structure of our panel, we follow Whited (2006) and
Leary and Roberts (2005) and estimate a mixed proportional hazard model, for which the hazard
function at time t for firm i with covariates xi(t) is
γi(t) = ωiγ0(t) exp(xi(t)
′κ). (8)
In this model, t is the time to investment (or equivalently the length of a spell), γ0(t) is the baseline
hazard, which we model as a non-parametric step function, and exp(xi(t)
′κ) is the relative risk
associated with the set of covariates xi(t), which allow the hazard to shift up or down depending
on their values and on κ. Finally, ωi is a random variable representing unobserved heterogeneity,
which we assume to be independent of xi(t). The covariates that we include are the profitability
of growth options, the bargaining power of shareholders in default, credit supply, competition, and
liquidation costs. We estimate this model using maximum likelihood.
Consistent with economic intuition, Table 1 shows that firms with more (or more valuable)
growth options or operating in more competitive environments invest more readily. Firms invest
also more readily when the supply of informed lenders is stronger since the cost of capital decreases
with credit supply. By contrast, liquidation costs, and the bargaining power of shareholders in
default diminish investment propensities by making outside financing more costly.
Insert Table 1 Here
An additional implication of our model is that negative shocks to the supply of bank debt may
hamper investment even if firms have enough financial slack to finance investment (due to the
ability to issue equity costlessly), consistent with the findings in Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993)
and Lemmon and Roberts (2010). Indeed, in our model, investment and financing decisions are
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jointly determined and the profitability of investment depends on the financing instrument chosen
by the firm. As a result, a change in the supply or in the cost of one of the financing instruments
can have major effects on the timing and probability of investment.
2.4. Summary of empirical implications
Before turning to the empirical analysis, we summarize our main testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Debt choice. Firms ( i) with more growth options, ( ii) higher bargaining power
in default, ( iii) operating in more competitive product markets, and ( iv) facing lower credit supply
are more likely to issue public debt.
Hypothesis 2: Investment. Firms with ( i) high bargaining power of shareholders in default and
( ii) high liquidation costs delay investment, whereas firms ( iii) operating in competitive markets,
( iv) facing a strong credit supply, or ( v) with profitable growth options speed up investment.
To the best of our knowledge, our predictions on the effects of competition, credit supply, or
bargaining power of shareholders in default on debt choice are novel. The prediction on the effects
of credit supply on investment is also new to the literature. Some of our other predictions on
investment timing are shared with existing studies. For example, Sundaresan and Wang (2007)
show that higher bargaining power of shareholders in default delays investment. However, to
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide evidence supporting this result. Akdogu
and MacKay (2008) document a non-linear relation between investment hazards and measures of
product market competition. In addition, Almeida and Campello (2008) and Chaney, Sraer, and
Thesmar (2012) find that the level of investment is positively related to asset tangibility.
Our study complements that of Akdogu and MacKay by demonstrating the effects of competi-
tion on corporate investment using a new measure that has been shown to better capture competi-
tion. Similarly, while Almeida and Campello (2008) and Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012) focus
on the relation between investment levels and tangibility, our analysis examines instead the effects
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of asset tangibility on the timing of large investment projects. That is, in contrast to these studies,
our empirical approach allows us to capture the effects of our explanatory variables on infrequent
and lumpy investment (see Doms and Dunne, 1998, or Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power, 1999, for
evidence suggesting that investment decisions are lumpy).
Remark: We show in the Appendix that modeling private debt using credit lines produces the
same results on the effects of the profitability of the growth option or volatility if the pre-committed
interest rate does not depend on firm characteristics. In that case, credit lines become less attractive
as the growth option becomes more valuable because the rate on the credit line does not depend on
pi whereas the cost of public debt decreases with pi. By contrast, the cost of public debt goes up as
volatility increases while the interest rate on the credit line remains constant, making credit lines
more attractive. One important difference between credit lines and search is that higher bargaining
power of shareholders would lead to a more extensive use of private debt. Indeed, the rate on the
line of credit is independent of η and the value of equity increases with η, making credit lines more
attractive to shareholders. Lastly, for credit supply to matter, we would need to assume that the
interest rate on the credit line decreases with credit supply.
3. Empirical analysis
3.1. Data and sample description
Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of U.S. firms. We begin the sample construction by
collecting data from Compustat’s annual database for the period 1988-2007. Financial services
firms (one-digit SIC equal to six) and regulated industries (two-digit SIC equal to 49) are excluded
from the sample (see Leary and Roberts, 2005, or Whited, 2006). We also drop firm-years with
negative or zero total assets or sales, and firm-years for which the negative EBITDA is larger
than total assets (see Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson, 2009). The results are robust to relaxing these
constraints.
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We then merge this data set with data from various other sources. First, following Erel, Julio,
Kim, and Weisbach (2012), we obtain data on public debt issues from the Mergent Fixed Income
Securities Database (FISD) and data on bank debt from Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan
database. From FISD, we use all USD public debt issues made by domestic industrial firms with a
valid issuer CUSIP, offering date, offering amount, and maturity. Similarly, from Dealscan we get
all sole-lender and syndicated bank loans with a valid GVKEY, loan start date, loan amount, and
maturity. We only keep firms that issue at least one bond or loan during our sample period, and
we eliminate (i) loans that are explicitly used for repaying existing loans, and (ii) very small bonds
and loans as they are unlikely to be used for investment purposes.10
Next, we collect data on industry competition from the Hoberg and Phillips data library. We also
retrieve institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters’ ownership database, and corporate
governance data on the E-Index used in the paper by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). Finally,
we get data on credit conditions from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending
Practices from the Federal Reserve. Using these data sources, we construct the following variables.
Growth options (pi). We measure the importance of growth opportunities using the firm’s sales
growth as in Whited (2006), Grullon, Lyandres, and Zhdanov (2012), or Purnanandam and Rajan
(2012). Sales growth is computed as the growth in sales (sale) from year t− 1 to t.
Shareholders’ bargaining power in default (η). Following Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007),
we measure shareholders’ bargaining power in default by the fraction of total equity owned by
institutional investors since more sophisticated and coordinated institutional investors are better
at bargaining with creditors in potential renegotiations.
Supply of bank loans (δ). Our main proxy for the supply of bank loans (credit supply) is
based on the “Senior Loan Officier Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices” from the Federal
10We compute the bond and loan amount to asset ratios, respectively, and drop the lowest five percent of each
distribution. Keeping these observations in the sample has no impact on our results.
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Reserve.11 The Federal Reserve conducts this survey by asking the sixty largest banks and twenty-
four U.S. branches of foreign banks how their bank is changing their credit standards. We focus on
the variable “Net percentage of banks tightening standards for commercial and industrial loans to
large and middle-market firms.” In actual tests, we lag this variable by one quarter and multiply
it by minus one so that a higher value implies a higher supply of bank loans. The data is at the
quarterly frequency and only available after the second quarter of 1990.12
Competition (λ). Our main proxy for the intensity of competition is the product market fluidity
measure developed by Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2012), available in the Hoberg and Phillips
data library starting in year 1997. This proxy is based on product descriptions from firm 10-Ks
and captures the structure and evolution of the product space occupied by firms. In particular, it
captures competitive threats faced by firms and the changes in rivals’ products relative to the firm.
Liquidation costs (α). Following Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007), we use non-fixed assets (1-
net PPE (ppent)) scaled by total assets as our main liquidation cost proxy. In our estimations, we
expect liquidation costs to decrease investment propensities.
We include in our estimations several control variables that have been shown to affect debt
structure (see e.g. Houston and James, 1996, Johnson, 1997, Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subra-
maniam, 1999, or Colla, Ippolito, and Li, 2012). We measure cash flow volatility as the annual
standard deviation of cash flows over the past five years, where we require at least three consecutive
observations. Size is the logarithm of net sales (sale). Market leverage is book debt over the mar-
ket value of assets (market equity plus total assets minus total common equity (ceq)). A dummy
variable, IG rating, takes the value of one when the firm has an investment grade rating and zero
11Several recent papers use data from this survey to capture credit supply conditions, e.g., Erel, Julio, Kim, and
Weisbach (2012), Murfin (2012), or Becker and Ivashina (2012).
12In additional tests, we follow Erel, Julio, Kim, and Weisbach (2012) and use two additional proxies for the supply
of bank loans. The first proxy is real GDP growth at the quarterly frequency. The second measure for the supply of
bank loans is a dummy variable equal to one if the economy is in an expansion according to the NBER in a particular
quarter and zero otherwise. The results using these variables are available upon request.
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otherwise. Finally, in our analysis of investment hazards, investment denotes capital expenditures
(capx) during the fiscal year divided by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. We winsorize
all firm-level variables at the 1% level in each tail to minimize the impact of outliers. Table 2 shows
the definitions of all the variables used in the analysis.
Insert Table 2 Here
Panel A of Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of the firm characteristics. The full sample
is an unbalanced panel with 49,063 firm-year observations.13 The average market-to-book ratio
is 1.53, average sales growth is 16%, and the average intangibility measure is 69%. The average
proportion of common stock held by institutional investors is 46%, a value slightly lower than the
one reported by Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007). Investment has a mean value of 7.6% of lagged
total assets. Firms in our sample have average log sales of 5.86, which corresponds to total sales of
350 million. Moreover, they have an average market leverage of 20%, cash flow of 4.8% of assets,
and cash flow volatility of 7.7%, and a default probability of 18.9% (median of 0.4%).
Insert Table 3 Here
Panel B provides descriptive statistics for the credit supply and competition variables. Over
our sample period, the average net percentage of banks tightening credit standards is 6.3%. Fur-
thermore, our main proxy for competition, product market fluidity, has an average value of 6.6,
which is close to the value of 6.9 reported by Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2012).
13The number of observations is lower for the debt choice analysis. The reason for the difference is that in the debt
choice analysis, we use the sample firms at the monthly frequency (as Erel, Julio, Kim, and Weisbach, 2012) and only
keep the firm-months in which firms actually issue at least one bond or loan. By contrast, for the investment hazard
analysis, we have the same set of firms in a more traditional firm-year panel data set.
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3.2. The choice between bonds and bank loans
In this section, we test the model’s predictions regarding the choice between bonds and bank loans.
We collapse each firm’s bond and bank loan issues at the month level and match the firm-months
observations with accounting information from the most recent year-end reported in Compustat
and with the quarterly macroeconomic data. We only keep the firm-months in which firms issue
a bond or loan. Next, we eliminate firm-months in which firms issue both bonds and bank loans
(477 observations) and drop convertible bond issues (1,812 observations). We end up with a sample
containing 3,602 firm-months with bond issues (4,692 bond issues) and 10,934 firm-months with
bank loan issues (15,575 loan issues).
Insert Table 4 Here
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics on how the bond and loan issues are distributed over the
sample period and how they vary by firm size. The number of bond issues gradually increases
at the beginning of our sample period, reaching a maximum of 463 issues in the year 1998. The
number of loan issues experiences significant growth with a maximum of 1,226 loan issues in 2004.
This growth in the syndicated loan market is consistent with recent research on this topic (see,
e.g., Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). Next, in each year, we split the number of bond and loan
issues by the median size of the issuer and report the number of issues for small and large firms,
respectively. As expected, bonds are predominantly issued by large firms, while small firms have a
preference for loans. Finally, we note that in each year about 50% of our sample firms do not issue
any bonds, while only about 5% of firms do not issue any loans.
To test the model predictions, we estimate logistic discrete choice models in which the dependent
variable equals one if the firm issues public debt and zero if the firm issues private debt in a given
month. In these logistic regressions, we are interested in measuring the effects of growth options,
bargaining power in default, credit supply, and competition on the probability of issuing public or
private debt. Following the literature, we include other potential determinants of the debt choice,
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including firm size, leverage, and credit rating (see Erel, Julio, Kim, and Weisbach, 2012, Johnson,
1997, Denis and Mihov, 2003, or Gomes and Phillips, 2012). Table 5 presents the main results.
Insert Table 5 Here
All six specifications of Table 5 examine the effects of growth options on the likelihood of issuing
public debt. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant in all columns, consistent with
the model’s predictions.14 In column 1, for instance, the coefficient of growth options has a value of
0.297, corresponding to a response probability of 0.20 evaluated at the mean of all covariates. The
coefficient implies that a one standard deviation increase in sales growth (evaluated at the mean of
all regressors) increases the response probability to 0.23, which is a relative increase of 15%.
In column 2, we add shareholders’ bargaining power measured by institutional ownership as an
additional regressor. The coefficient has a value of 0.917 and is statistically significant. The response
probability for this coefficient is 0.228. A one standard deviation increase in institutional ownership
increases the response probability to 0.275. The intuition is that as shareholders’ bargaining power
increases, shareholders are able to extract more rents from creditors in a potential renegotiation,
and bank loans becomes more costly. As a consequence, a bond issue is more likely.
Next, we test in the third column whether the supply of bank loans (based on the Federal
Reserve survey) affects the probability of issuing a bond. We observe a negative and statistically
significant coefficient with a value of -0.708 (response probability of 0.23), a result consistent with
the model’s predictions. Intuitively, when the supply of bank loans increases, search frictions
decrease and firms are relatively more likely to find informed bank financing.15
14We get very similar results to those presented in the tables when we estimate all our specifications with the
market-to-book ratio as a proxy for growth options.
15If a firm issues public debt to refinance a private loan (as opposed to financing a new growth opportunity), and
if the propensity to refinance a bank loan is negatively correlated with credit supply, our results could be biased
towards finding an effect. However, the proportion of bond issues used to refinance existing bank debt is only 3.5%
in Thomson Reuters bond issue database. We therefore believe that this issue is of minor concern in the data.
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Another unique prediction of our model is that firms operating in more competitive environ-
ments should rely more on public debt.16 Table 5 reveals that product market competition has a
positive effect on the probability of issuing public debt. In column 4, the coefficient of competition
is positive and statistically significant.
In columns 5 and 6, we include industry fixed effects to control for broad industry effects, using
the fixed industry classification (FIC) from the Hoberg and Phillips data library. The specification
in column 6 is in addition estimated with random firm effects. The estimates in columns 5 and 6
are very similar to those in column 4. Finally, the coefficient estimates of the control variables are
consistent with the existing literature. Specifically, the negative coefficient of cash flow volatility
(although not significant) is consistent with the idea that firms that are more likely to be inefficiently
liquidated have a preference for bank loans. The positive coefficient on firm size supports Fama’s
(1985) argument that larger firms find it more economical to produce the information required for
public securities, i.e. that issuance costs are relatively less important for these firms. In addition,
firms with a higher leverage and an investment grade rating have a higher probability to issue bonds
(see Erel, Julio, Kim, and Weisbach, 2012, or Denis and Mihov, 2003).
To assess the robustness of our results, we estimate a number of additional specifications in
Table 6. We include additional control variables for firms’ capital market access and for firms’
internal corporate governance. We also include interaction terms between bargaining power and
firm’s default probability and between growth options and competition to shed further light on the
economic channel. Finally, we add a control variable capturing pre-existing banking relationships
of firms (see Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011)).
One potential concern with the results so far could be that the proxy for bargaining power,
the proportion of institutional ownership, also measures firms’ access to the bond market and
active monitoring of institutional investors. To address these concerns, we add a dividend payer
16This prediction of our model is not straightforward as more competition generally implies a higher likelihood of
default (see e.g. Zhdanov, 2007, or Valta, 2012) and therefore a preference for private debt.
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dummy control variable in column 1 and the E-Index (see Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009))
as a governance control variable in column 2. The specification in column 1 now includes three
widely used proxies for financing constraints (size, credit rating, and dividend payer dummy), and
the results are consistent with our main results. In column 2, the addition of a governance control
variable does not change our main results either.
Insert Table 6 Here
Our model also predicts that the effect of shareholders’ bargaining power should be more impor-
tant for firms with high default risk. We test this prediction by interacting a proxy for firm’s default
probability with bargaining power, where the default probability is estimated following Bharath
and Shumway (2008). The coefficient of default probability is significantly negative in column 3,
supporting the view that firms with high default risk prefer private debt to avoid inefficient liqui-
dation. Importantly, the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and statistically significant,
while the direct effect of bargaining power is small and statistically insignificant. These findings
suggest that shareholders’ bargaining power in default matters for debt choice mostly for firms with
high default risk, and further corroborates the use our proxy for bargaining power.
In column 4 we test an additional prediction of our model that allows us to further differentiate
our paper from existing contributions. Specifically, the model predicts that the effect of growth
options is stronger in more competitive industries. The intuition is that the financing risk asso-
ciated with bank lending is more severe when firms are more likely to lose their growth option
to competitors. This effect pushes firms towards issuing bonds. To test this prediction, we split
our competition variable into a dummy for high and low competition (at the sample median) and
interact it with growth options. The estimates in column 4 reveal that the coefficients of high com-
petition and of the interaction term are both significantly positive, while the coefficient of growth
options decreases in magnitude and becomes insignificant, consistent with our model.
Column 5 further shows that the results are robust to the inclusion of a control variable capturing
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firms’ banking relationships.17 Finally, in column 6 we restrict the sample to bond and loan issues
around investment spikes. We follow Whited (2006) and consider that an investment spike occurs
in the data if the ratio of investment to total assets is two times greater than the firm median. We
then only keep bond and loan issues that were issued between three years before to one year after a
spike. This sample restriction allows us to more closely tie firms’ financing patterns to investment.
While the sample size decreases to 1,231, the results are similar to the results of the full sample.
3.3. Investment hazards
In this section, we test the implications of the model for investment timing by analyzing firms’ in-
vestment rates (hazard rates) using a multivariate duration analysis (as in, e.g., Leary and Roberts,
2005, or Whited, 2006). To do so, we estimate a mixed proportional hazard model as described in
equation (8), in which t is the time to investment.
An investment spike occurs in the data if the ratio of investment to total assets is two times
greater than the firm median. Our sample includes firms without any investment spike (censored
firms) as well as firms with several spikes. Overall, we observe in our sample 5,829 investment
spikes, corresponding to a fraction of 11.88% of spikes in the data. The average (uncensored) time
between investment spikes (inaction spell) is 2.23 years. These values are similar to those reported
by Whited (2006). The model is estimated using maximum likelihood.
Insert Table 7 Here
Table 7 presents estimates of the proportional hazard model. These estimates are shift param-
eters showing whether and by how much a variable moves the baseline hazard rate up or down.
The estimations in Table 7 are without unobserved heterogeneity, that we introduce in Table 8.
Moreover, we do not include yearly dummies because these would eliminate the variation in our
17We estimate several specifications in which we use alternative proxies for growth options, credit supply, and
competition. Our results are robust to these additional proxies and are available upon request.
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credit supply proxies. Consistent with our model, columns 1 to 5 of Table 7 show that growth
options shift hazard rates up in that the coefficient of growth options is positive and statistically
significant in all columns. In addition, the effect is economically large. For instance, in column 1
the coefficient has a value of 0.339, which implies that a one standard deviation increase in sales
growth increases the investment hazard rate by 18.5% (i.e., exp(0.339× 0.50)− 1).
One prediction of our model is that an increase of the bargaining power of shareholders in
default increases the cost of financing and makes investment opportunities less attractive. As a
result, firms delay investment (see also Sundaresan and Wang, 2007). In columns 2, the coefficient
on bargaining power is negative and statistically significant, consistent with our theory. Specifically,
a one standard deviation increase in bargaining power decreases the investment hazard rate by 4.4%
(i.e., exp(−0.149×0.29)−1). Our estimates also show that the coefficient of credit supply is positive
and statistically significant in columns 3 to 6. When the supply of lenders is strong, the availability
of capital increases and its cost decreases. As a consequence, investment opportunities are more
attractive and firms speed up investment.
Next, we observe that competitive threat shifts hazard rates up. Specifically, the coefficient of
competition is positive and statistically significant in columns 4 to 6. For instance, the coefficient
in the fourth column implies that a one standard deviation increase in competition increases the
investment hazard rate by 7.4%. This result is consistent with the findings of Akdogu and MacKay
(2008). Our analysis adds to their paper by showing that this result also obtains with the recent
fluidity measure developed by Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2012).
In column 5, we add liquidation costs as an additional explanatory variable. The coefficient on
liquidation costs is negative and statistically significant. Similar to shareholders’ bargaining power,
higher liquidation costs in default increase the cost of financing and make investment opportunities
less attractive. Finally, column 6 also includes industry fixed effects. Note that the coefficients on
the control variables are as expected. Firms with high cash flows invest sooner (Whited, 2006),
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while large firms and firms with volatile cash flows tend to delay investment. Taken together, the
results from these proportional hazard estimations provide support for the model’s predictions.
Insert Tables 8 Here
Table 8 reports robustness tests. In columns 1, 2, and 3, we respectively add a dividend payer
dummy, the E-Index, and the default probability as additional control variables. In column 4, we
vary the threshold for investment spikes. Finally, in columns 5 and 6 we allow for unobserved
heterogeneity, which helps absorbing the cumulative effect of potentially omitted covariates. As in
Whited (2006) or Leary and Roberts (2005), we assume that the unobserved heterogeneity has a
normal (column 5) or gamma (column 6) distribution. In all six columns, the estimates are very
similar to those reported in Table 8.
4. Conclusion
This paper develops a model to study the choice between bonds and bank loans in a firm’s marginal
financing decision and its effects on corporate investment. In the model, private debt is renego-
tiable and, therefore, more attractive to the firm than public debt. However, private lenders with
the required expertise are scarce so that the firm faces search frictions when seeking to finance
investment with private debt. In that respect, the paper takes a first step in constructing a model
of corporate investment and financing decisions with capital supply effects.
Using this model, the paper shows that firms with more growth options, higher bargaining
power in default, operating in more competitive product markets, and facing lower credit supply
are more likely to issue bonds. It also demonstrates that firms with high liquidation costs and high
bargaining power of shareholders in default delay investment, while firms operating in competitive
markets, facing a strong supply of lenders, or having profitable growth options speed up investment.
The paper provides supportive evidence for the predictions of the model using a large sample of
U.S. firms for the period 1988-2007.
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Appendix
A. Firm value after investment
Denote by Xi the default threshold selected by shareholders, for i = B,D where i = B (resp. i = D)
when the firm issues bank (resp. market) debt. After investment, shareholders get the cash flow stream
(1− τ) (X − c1i=D − b1i=B) dt as well as the capital gains E [dE2] over each interval dt. Using Itoˆ’s lemma,
we then have that equity value after investment satisfies:
rE2 (X; b, c) = µXE
′
2 (X; b, c) +
σ2
2
X2E′′2 (X; b, c) + (1− τ) (X − c1i=D − b1i=B) ,
which is solved subject to the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions
E2 (Xi; b, c) = (1− q) ηα1i=BpiΛXi, and E′2 (Xi; b, c) = (1− q) ηα1i=BpiΛ,
together with the no-bubbles condition limX↑+∞ (E (X; b, c) /X) < +∞. Using standard calculations (see
e.g. Leland, 1994), we have that E2 (X; b, c) satisfies for X > Xi:
E2 (X; b, c) = piΛX − (1− τ) (c1i=D + b1i=B)
r
−
[
(1− (1− q) ηα1i=B)piΛXi −
(1− τ) (c1i=D + b1i=B)
r
](
X
Xi
)ν
where ν < 0 is the negative root of 12σ
2y(y − 1) + µy = r and the default threshold that maximizes equity
value satisfies:
X∗i =
ν
ν − 1
r − µ
pir
(
c1i=D +
b1i=B
1− (1− q) ηα
)
for i = B,D.
Using similar steps, we can derive the values of bank and market debt as:18
B(X; b) =
b
r
+
[
(1− qα− (1− q) ηα)piΛXi −
c
r
]( X
XB
)ν
D(X; c) =
c
r
+
[
(1− α)piΛXi −
c
r
]( X
XD
)ν
.
The first order conditions with respect to b and c are given by
∂V2 (X; b, 0)
∂b
= 0, and
∂ [V2 (X; 0, c)− ιD(X; c)]
∂c
= 0,
where V2 (X; b, c) = E2 (X; b, c) +B(X; b) +D(X; c). The solutions to these first order conditions are given
by equations (2) and (3) (one can easily check that the second order condition for this optimization problem
is negative, ensuring optimality). Plugging the expressions for the value maximizing coupon payments and
default thresholds in V2 (X; b, c)− ιD(X; c) and simplifying yields the expressions reported in the main text.
B. Value before investment
The value of equity before investment satisfies
(r + λ)E1 (X) = (LE1) (X) + (1− τ + λΛ)X, X < X∗B ,
(r + λ+ δθ)E1 (X) = (LE1) (X) + (1− τ + λΛ + δθΦ)X − δθI − φ, X ∈ [X∗B , X
∗
D).
18In the model, the private debt contract has positive NPV. Indeed, private debtholders get a claim with value
given by B(X; b) plus a fraction 1− θ of the investment surplus. The NPV of the private debt contract is therefore
zero when θ = 1. Otherwise, it is equal to the fraction of the investment surplus captured by private debtholders.
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The general solution to this set of equations is
E1 (X) =
{
AXξ +BXϑ + 1−τ+λΛr+λ−µ X, for X < X
∗
B ,
CXβ +DXζ + 1−τ+λΛ+δθΦr+λ+δθ−µ X − δθI+φr+λ+δθ , for ∈ [X
∗
B , X
∗
D),
where A, B, C, D are constant parameters, ξ > 1, ζ > 1 and β < 0 are defined in Proposition 1, and
ϑ < 0. The condition E1(0) = 0 implies that B = 0. Simple algebraic manipulations of the other boundary
conditions yield
A =
{[
Φ− 1− τ + λΛ
r + λ− µ
]
X
∗
B − I
}(
X
∗
B
)−ξ
,
C =
{
ζ − 1
ζ − β [Ψ− Σ]X
∗
D −
ζ
ζ − β
(r + λ) I − φ
r + λ+ δθ
}(
X
∗
D
)−β
,
D =
{
β − 1
β − ζ [Ψ− Σ]X
∗
D −
β
β − ζ
(r + λ) I − φ
r + λ+ δθ
}(
X
∗
D
)−ζ
,
C =
{[
ζ − ξ
ζ − βΦ +
ξ − 1
ζ − β
1− τ + λΛ
r + λ− µ −
ζ − 1
ζ − βΣ
]
X
∗
B −
ζ (r + λ) I − ζφ− ξ (r + λ+ δθ) I
(ζ − β) (r + λ+ δθ)
}(
X
∗
B
)−β
,
D =
{[
ξ − β
ζ − βΦ−
ξ − 1
ζ − β
1− τ + λΛ
r + λ− µ +
β − 1
ζ − βΣ
]
X
∗
B −
ξ (r + λ+ δθ) I − β (r + λ) I + βφ
(ζ − β) (r + λ+ δθ)
}(
X
∗
B
)−ζ
.
where Σ = 1−τ+λΛ+δθΦr+λ+δθ−µ . Define z = X
∗
B/X
∗
D < 1. Using the two equations for C and D, one can show that:
X
∗
D =
ζ[(r+λ)I−φ](1−z−β)+ξ(r+λ+δθ)Iz−β
(ζ−β)(r+λ+δθ)
ζ−1
ζ−βΨ +
ζ−1
ζ−β
1−τ+λΛ+δθΦ
r+λ+δθ−µ (z
1−β − 1)− ζ−ξζ−βΦz1−β − ξ−1ζ−β 1−τ+λΛr+λ−µ z1−β
,
and
X
∗
D =
β[(r+λ)I−φ](z−ζ−1)−ξ(r+λ+δθ)Iz−ζ
(ζ−β)(r+λ+δθ)
1−β
ζ−βΨ +
1−β
ζ−β
1−τ+λΛ+δθΦ
r+λ+δθ−µ (z
1−ζ − 1)− ξ−βζ−βΦz1−ζ + ξ−1ζ−β 1−τ+λΛr+λ−µ z1−ζ
.
Using these two equations, we then have that z is the solution to equation (6).
C. Simulation procedure
Our analysis of the determinants of investment hazards and financing choices is based on a panel of simulated
firms (as in Strebulaev, 2007, or Morellec and Schu¨rhoff, 2011). We assume that the economy consists of a
large number of firms. Each firm i is characterized by the model parameters (σ, µ, α, τ, η, θ, ι, δ, λ, pi), which
may be firm- or industry-specific. We use the parameter values of Figure 1 in our base case environment. The
variables that determine investment and financing strategies in our setting are the firms’ growth potential (as
measured by pi), the bargaining power of shareholders in default η, liquidation costs α, cash flow volatility
σ, credit supply δ, and product market competition λ. We introduce variation across firms by drawing for
each firm separate parameters from their natural domains. As in Morellec and Schu¨rhoff (2011), we opt for
perturbations of the base parametrization in Figures 1 and 2. That is, we start with the base parametrization
δ = 3, λ = 1, σ = 0.2886, α = 0.45, η = 0.5, and pi = 1.25 and draw each of the parameters from uniform
distributions with the same bounds as in Figure 1 while keeping the other parameters fixed. We simulate a
total of N = 237, 400 firms.
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D. Credit lines
So far we have ignored the role of credit lines in liquidity or credit supply management.19 A firm that obtains
a line of credit receives a nominal amount of debt capacity against which it can draw funds. The used portion
of a line of credit is a debt obligation, whereas the unused portion remains off the balance sheet. The pricing
of credit lines is generally characterized by two components: a commitment fee and a precommitted interest
rate (see Sufi, 2009). The commitment fee represents a percentage of the unused portion of the line of credit.
The precommitted interest rate is the rate at which firms can draw funds from the credit line. In the analysis
below, we denote the size of the credit line by ` > 0, the precommitted interest rate by r`, and assume that
there is no commitment fee.
The firm can use common stock and either credit lines or public debt to finance the capital expenditure.
Since there is no credit supply uncertainty, the firm will use the cheapest source of funds at the time of
investment, i.e. that associated with the highest equity value. The benefit of using the credit line in this
context is that the debt is private and renegotiable. The costs of using the credit line are represented by the
pre-committed interest rate and by the investment distortions induced by this pre-commitment. That is,
because the pre-committed rate of interest on the credit line does not depend on the timing of investment,
debt will be either overpriced or underpriced leading to distortions in investment policy.
Suppose that, at the time of investment, the capital expenditure is financed by using the line of credit
and common stock (if ` < I) so that total payment to debtholders after investment is r``. Using similar
steps as above, it is possible to show that equity value after investment when using a credit line, denoted by
E2(X; `), satisfies
E2(X; `) = piΛX − 1− τ
r
r``− (1− τ) r
``
r (ν − 1)
(
X
X2,`
)ν
,
where the default threshold after investment, denoted by X2,`, satisfies
X2,` =
ν
ν − 1
r − µ
pir
r``
1− (1− q)ηα,
where ν < 0 is the negative root of the quadratic equation 12σ
2y (y − 1) + µy = r. Note that since r` is
independent of η, credit lines become more attractive as η increases. The value of equity before investment
is then given by
E1 (X; `) =
1− τ + λ
r + λ− µX +
[
E2(X
∗
C (`) ; `)− (I − `)−
1− τ + λ
r + λ− µX
∗
C (`)
](
X
X
∗
C (`)
)ξ
where the value maximizing investment trigger X
∗
C solves
ξ
ξ − 1
[
1− τ
r
r``+ I − `
]
=
(
piΛ− 1− τ + λ
r + λ− µ
)
X
∗
C (`)−
ξ − ν
ξ − 1
(1− τ) r``
r (ν − 1)
[(
ν − 1
ν
pir
r − µ
1− (1− q)ηα
r``
)
X
∗
C (`)
]ν
.
Suppose next that the firm issues public debt instead of using credit lines. In this case, the value of
equity before investment is given by
E1 (X; c
∗) =
1− τ + λ
r + λ− µX +
[
V2
(
X
∗
D; 0, c
∗
)
− ιD(X∗D; c∗)− I −
1− τ + λ
r + λ− µX
∗
D
](
X
X
∗
D
)ϑ
where the value maximizing investment trigger satisfies
X
∗
D =
ξ
ξ − 1
I
piΛ
{
1 + (τ−ι)(ν−1)ν(1−τ) (Γ− Γ1−ν)− [α+ ι (1− α)] Γ1−ν
}
− 1−τ+λr+λ−µ
.
19We than an anonymous referee for suggesting this extension of the model.
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To examine the effects of the parameters of the model on the choice between credit lines and public debt,
the top four panels of Figure 2 plot the relative value of equity, defined as the value of equity when using
public debt over the value of equity when using a credit line (i.e. E1(X;c
∗)
E1(X;`∗)
), as a function of the profitability
of the growth option pi, the volatility of cash flows σ, the bargaining power of shareholders in default η, and
bankruptcy costs α. In this figure, we assume that the firm picks `∗ ≥ 0 to maximize shareholder wealth
at time t = 0, given r`. A value above 1 implies that shareholders are better off financing the investment
project using a combination of common stock and public debt. Input parameter values are set as in the base
case environment. The parameters for the line of credit are based on a recent empirical study by Sufi (2009).
In this study, Sufi finds that the median precommitted interest rate is 150 basis points above LIBOR, i.e.
r` = r + 1.5%, in a sample of 11,578 credit lines obtained by 4,011 public firms between 1996 and 2003.
(Campello et al., 2012, report similar numbers in a recent survey of 800 CFOs from North America, Europe,
and Asia.) For this value of the pre-committed interest rate, we have to raise the corporate tax rate to
τ = 30% for the firm to use credit lines at all.
Insert Figure 2 Here
Figure 2 reveals that in our base case environment, the value of equity with a credit line is almost always
dominated by the value without a credit line. That is, we find that the costs induced by the pre-determined
interest rate impose larger costs than the issuance costs of public debt in most economic environments. In
our base case environment for example the credit spread on public debt at the time of issuance is 97 basis
points, which is much lower than the 150 basis points of credit lines.20 As the value of the growth option
increases, the credit line becomes more and more mispriced, leading to a increase in the relative value of
equity. By contrast, as cash flow volatility or bankruptcy costs increase, public debt becomes more expensive
and credit lines more attractive. Lastly, as the bargaining power of shareholders increases, their cash flow
in default increases, rendering credit lines more attractive.
One important aspect that our analysis does not capture is the funding risk associated with sources
of debt other than credit lines. The empirical literature on lines of credit argues that they are motivated
primarily by capital market frictions and that a committed line of credit overcomes these frictions by ensuring
that funds are available for valuable investment projects. Interestingly, the model also allows us to examine
the choice between a credit line and search when choosing to issue private debt, i.e. assuming that public
debt is not available. To do so, we can use the same steps as in the main text and replace the boundary
conditions for equity value with public debt financing (i.e. equations (4) and (5)) by the following conditions:
E1(X1,`; `) = E2(X1,`; `)− (I − `)
E′1(X1,`; `) = E
′
2(X1,`; `)
where X1,` is the investment threshold when financing the project with a credit line.
The bottom two panels of Figure 2 plot the investment thresholds selected by the firm as a function of
the arrival rate of investors δ and the bargaining power of creditors at the time of investment ρ. The figure
shows that when the arrival rate of investors is very low, firms may find it optimal to use credit lines as a
risk management instrument (i.e. as a hedge against a contraction in the supply of credit). This result is
consistent with the evidence in Campello et al. (2012). In particular, they find that firms with more positive
investment projects only use credit lines when immediate access to external funds is difficult (i.e. when δ
is low). These authors write “the high proportion of funds being drawn from outstanding lines of credit
during the crisis is consistent with a story where alternative sources of liquidity were unavailable.” Another
implication of Figure 2 is that credit lines become more attractive as the bargaining power of shareholders
decreases, i.e. as the cost of debt in subsequent issues increases (due to the limited competition or supply of
capital in the debt markets).
20Note also that if we take all credit lines (Revolver/Line ≥ 1.Yr) in Dealscan from 1988 to 2007, the average
spread over LIBOR is 190 basis points (with median 175). By contrast, the average treasury spread (the difference
between the yield on the bond and a treasury bond with corresponding maturity) for all bonds in the FISD database
over the same time period is only 98 basis points (with median 59), consistent with the numbers in our model.
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Table 1
Investment hazard model estimates: Simulated data
Table 1 reports estimates from semi-parametric investment hazard models on simulated data. The
independent variables are the profitability of growth options pi, liquidation costs α, sharehold-
ers’ bargaining power in default η, the arrival rate of informed lenders δ, and the arrival rate of
competitors λ. The symbol *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Growth options 1.103*** 1.104*** 1.105*** 1.105*** 1.106***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Liquidation costs -0.387*** -0.411*** -0.412*** -0.413***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Bargaining power in default -0.229*** -0.229*** -0.230***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Credit supply 0.022*** 0.022***
(0.004) (0.004)
Competition 0.047***
(0.004)
Observations 237,400 237,400 237,400 237,400 237,400
Log likelihood -97,053 -96,874 -96,636 -96,621 -96,555
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Table 2
Data definitions
Variable Variable Definition Source
Growth options Growth in sales (sale) from t− 1 to t Compustat
Book debt Debt in current liabilities (dlc) + long-term debt (dltt) Compustat
MB-ratio Market equity (csho + prcc f) + Book debt + Compustat
Preferred stock (pstk)
- Deferred taxes and investment tax credits
(txditc)) / Assets total (at)
Liquidation costs (1 - Net PPE (ppent)) / Assets total (at) Compustat
Bargaining power Fraction of stock owned by institutional investors Thomson
Reuter’s
Credit supply (-1) * Net percentage of banks tightening credit Federal
standards to large and middle-market firms Reserve
Competition Product market fluidity, available at Hoberg-Phillips
http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/industrydata/
Cash flow (Income before extraordinary items (ib) + depreciation Compustat
and amortization (dp)) / Assets total (at)
Volatility Annual standard deviation of cash flows over five Compustat
fiscal years (at least three consecutive obs.)
Size Logarithm of net sales (sale) Compustat
Market leverage Book debt / (Market equity + Assets total (at) - Compustat
Common equity (ceq))
IG rating Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has an Compustat
investment grade rating and zero otherwise
Investment Capital expenditures (capx) / Assets total (at) at the Compustat
beginning of the fiscal year
Dividend dummy Dummy equal to one if the firm pays a dividend, zero Compustat
otherwise
Default probability Estimate of firm’s default probability based on market Compustat-
values following Bharath and Shumway (2008) CRSP
E-Index Corporate governance index following Bebchuk, Cohen, L. Bebchuk
and Ferrell (2009)
Relation Number of relationship loans divided by the total Dealscan
number of loans by firm
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. Panel A shows
statistics for the firm-level variables. Panel B presents statistics for the macroeconomic and com-
petition variables. The sample period is 1988-2007. Please refer to Table 2 for a detailed definition
of the variables.
Panel A: Firm-level variables
Mean S.D. 25% 50% 75% Obs
Growth options (sales growth) 0.162 0.504 -0.013 0.086 0.218 49,063
MB-ratio 1.529 1.362 0.786 1.111 1.743 49,063
Bargaining power in default 0.456 0.289 0.205 0.451 0.684 36,811
Liquidation costs 0.694 0.227 0.560 0.751 0.876 49,063
Investment 0.076 0.092 0.025 0.049 0.092 49,063
Volatility 0.077 0.106 0.020 0.039 0.085 49,063
Market leverage 0.201 0.182 0.048 0.159 0.306 49,063
Log(sales) 5.862 2.022 4.480 5.846 7.222 49,063
IG rating 0.175 0.380 0.000 0.000 0.000 49,063
Cash flow 0.048 0.168 0.030 0.080 0.125 49,063
Default probability 0.189 0.309 0.000 0.004 0.266 43,256
Relation 0.202 0.219 0.000 0.167 0.333 45,293
Panel B: Macroeconomic and competition variables
Mean S.D. 25% 50% 75% Obs
Banks tightening lending (%) 6.295 20.166 -9.075 -0.275 19.625 46,569
Product market fluidity 6.601 3.257 4.195 6.028 8.400 27,337
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Table 5
Debt choice logistic regressions: Main results
Table 5 presents coefficient estimates from logistic regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy
equal to one if a firm issues a bond and zero if a firm issues bank debt in a given month. Please
refer to Table 2 for a detailed definition of the variables. The sample period is 1988-2007. All
specifications include yearly dummies. The specifications in column 5 and 6 include FIC-300
industry fixed effects, and the specification in column 6 is estimated with random firm effects.
Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-firm clustering are in parentheses below
the coefficient estimates. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Growth options 0.297*** 0.415*** 0.430*** 0.352*** 0.346*** 0.367***
(0.051) (0.066) (0.068) (0.078) (0.089) (0.075)
Bargaining power 0.917*** 0.934*** 0.645*** 0.684*** 0.681***
(0.158) (0.160) (0.185) (0.180) (0.201)
Credit supply -0.708*** -0.630** -0.643** -0.892***
(0.253) (0.291) (0.304) (0.331)
Competition 0.087*** 0.068*** 0.075***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.019)
Volatility -0.300 0.050 0.003 -0.963 0.230 0.292
(0.430) (0.497) (0.498) (0.605) (0.626) (0.714)
Market leverage 3.099*** 3.765*** 3.827*** 3.619*** 3.233*** 3.657***
(0.200) (0.218) (0.220) (0.233) (0.257) (0.292)
Size 0.321*** 0.329*** 0.324*** 0.357*** 0.359*** 0.472***
(0.026) (0.030) (0.031) (0.036) (0.037) (0.043)
IG rating 0.747*** 0.790*** 0.775*** 0.423*** 0.351*** 0.490***
(0.087) (0.089) (0.090) (0.106) (0.108) (0.125)
Constant -4.448*** -5.303*** -5.281*** -5.597*** -5.559*** -6.962***
(0.220) (0.250) (0.254) (0.297) (0.443) (0.488)
Observations 14,536 11,662 11,340 7,521 7,089 7,380
Log likelihood -7,022.76 -5,771.08 -5,635.90 -3,886.28 -3,593.92 -3,468.52
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Table 6
Debt choice logistic regressions: Robustness tests
Table 6 presents coefficient estimates from logistic regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy
equal to one if a firm issues a bond and zero if a firm issues bank debt in a given month. Column
1 includes an additional dummy variable equal to one if the firm pays a dividend, zero otherwise.
Column 2 includes the E-Index as additional variable. Column 3 includes an interaction term be-
tween the default probability and shareholders’ bargaining power in default. Column 4 contains an
interaction term between growth options and a dummy variable for high competition (split at the
median). Column 5 includes an additional variable controlling for existing banking relationships
of firms. Finally, column 6 restricts the sample to years around investment spikes. In particular,
it only considers bond and loan issues that are issued up to three years before to one year after
an investment spike. Please refer to Table 2 for a detailed definition of the variables. The sample
period is 1988-2007. All specifications include yearly dummies. Standard errors adjusted for het-
eroskedasticity and within-firm clustering are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The
symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Growth options 0.340*** 0.402** 0.309*** 0.172 0.351*** 0.534***
(0.080) (0.173) (0.078) (0.138) (0.063) (0.113)
Bargaining power 0.670*** 0.439** 0.281 0.560*** 0.871*** 0.432
(0.188) (0.209) (0.216) (0.184) (0.137) (0.418)
Credit supply -0.668** -0.637* -0.682** -0.645** -0.607** -1.437**
(0.294) (0.354) (0.296) (0.289) (0.283) (0.720)
Competition 0.087*** 0.059*** 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.133***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.034)
Volatility -0.820 -0.748 -0.201 -0.480 -1.047* -1.787
(0.608) (0.756) (0.586) (0.590) (0.553) (1.191)
Market leverage 3.655*** 3.557*** 4.656*** 3.720*** 3.657*** 4.473***
(0.236) (0.259) (0.326) (0.236) (0.181) (0.597)
Size 0.354*** 0.324*** 0.354*** 0.362*** 0.392*** 0.372***
(0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.026) (0.086)
IG rating 0.365*** 0.412*** 0.399*** 0.407*** 0.412*** 0.653**
(0.108) (0.093) (0.109) (0.105) (0.084) (0.308)
Dividend dummy 0.126
(0.088)
E-Index -0.033
(0.029)
Default probability -1.648***
(0.336)
Bargaining power × 1.391***
Default probability (0.511)
High competition 0.298***
(0.081)
Growth options × 0.302**
High competition (0.153)
Relation -0.701***
(0.170)
Constant -5.661*** -4.869*** -5.413*** -5.180*** -6.036*** -6.724***
(0.303) (0.373) (0.312) (0.284) (0.244) (0.776)
Observations 7,416 4,130 7,202 7,521 7,229 1,231
Log likelihood -3,820.21 -2,359.83 -3,748.13 -3,914.69 -3,549.89 -509.9743
Table 7
Investment hazard model estimates: Main results
Table 7 presents estimates from proportional hazard models for investment rates. An investment
spike occurs in the data if the ratio of investment to total asset is two times greater than the
firm median. Column 6 is estimated with FIC-300 industry fixed effects. Please refer to Table 2
for a detailed definition of the variables. The sample period is 1988-2007. Standard errors are
in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Growth options 0.339*** 0.350*** 0.341*** 0.344*** 0.341*** 0.373***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023)
Bargaining power -0.149** -0.180** -0.383*** -0.364*** -0.322***
(0.068) (0.070) (0.092) (0.093) (0.100)
Credit supply 0.334*** 0.208* 0.201* 0.284**
(0.087) (0.113) (0.113) (0.115)
Competition 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.036***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Liquidation costs -0.543*** -1.167***
(0.1) (0.136)
Volatility 0.167 0.054 0.054 -0.103 0.026 0.046
(0.129) (0.172) (0.174) (0.221) (0.223) (0.233)
Market leverage -0.176** -0.251*** -0.269*** -0.209 -0.452*** -0.555***
(0.074) (0.094) (0.098) (0.130) (0.139) (0.152)
Size -0.138*** -0.133*** -0.137*** -0.166*** -0.166*** -0.189***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018)
Cash flow 0.974*** 0.975*** 0.967*** 1.071*** 0.940*** 1.159***
(0.089) (0.114) (0.116) (0.146) (0.146) (0.155)
Constant -2.028*** -2.073*** -2.016*** -1.801*** -1.363*** -0.804**
(0.220) (0.253) (0.254) (0.271) (0.283) (0.337)
Observations 49063 36811 35051 22115 22115 21935
Log likelihood -16642.02 -11948.29 -11113.18 -6338.542 -6324.124 -6021.71
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Table 8
Investment hazard model estimates: Robustness tests
Table 8 presents estimates from proportional hazard models for investment rates. An investment
spike occurs in the data if the ratio of investment to total asset is two times greater than the firm
median. Column 1 includes an additional dummy variable equal to one if the firm pays a dividend,
zero otherwise. Column 2 includes the E-Index as additional variable. Column 3 includes the de-
fault probability as additional control variable. In column 4, the threshold for an investment spike
is three times the median. Columns 5 and 6 estimate the proportional hazard model with unob-
served heterogeneity (frailty). In column 5, we assume that unobserved heterogeneity is normally
distributed, whereas in column 6 we assume that it is gamma distributed. Please refer to Table 2
for a detailed definition of the variables. The sample period is 1988-2007. ρ is the ratio of the het-
erogeneity variance to one plus the heterogeneity variance. σ2 is the estimate of the heterogeneity
variance. Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The symbols ***, **
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Growth options 0.364*** 0.704*** 0.332*** 0.357*** 0.435*** 0.458***
(0.021) (0.093) (0.022) (0.027) (0.038) (0.043)
Bargaining power -0.377*** -0.830** -0.363*** -0.667*** -0.104 -0.100
(0.093) (0.413) (0.100) (0.146) (0.127) (0.125)
Credit supply 0.244** 0.162 0.175 0.331* 0.277** 0.309**
(0.113) (0.474) (0.121) (0.175) (0.139) (0.136)
Competition 0.016** 0.052* 0.013* 0.033*** 0.019* 0.019*
(0.007) (0.027) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Liquidation costs -0.606*** -1.251*** -0.523*** -0.670*** -0.840*** -0.864***
(0.101) (0.385) (0.104) (0.151) (0.152) (0.155)
Volatility 0.114 -0.139 0.036 0.547* -0.237 -0.255
(0.224) (0.951) (0.244) (0.301) (0.323) (0.316)
Market leverage -0.447*** -0.931 -0.050 -0.484** -0.715*** -0.714***
(0.139) (0.655) (0.207) (0.212) (0.189) (0.184)
Size -0.158*** -0.253*** -0.180*** -0.188*** -0.204*** -0.200***
(0.016) (0.069) (0.017) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Cash flow 0.965*** 1.190* 0.769*** 0.833*** 1.478*** 1.444***
(0.147) (0.713) (0.156) (0.197) (0.206) (0.201)
Dividend dummy -0.131**
(0.057)
E-Index -0.068
(0.071)
Default probability -0.493***
(0.139)
Constant -1.331*** -1.338 -1.201*** -2.188*** -1.763*** -1.268**
(0.292) (1.026) (0.287) (0.488) (0.623) (0.629)
ρ 0.314*
(0.171)
σ2 0.169
(0.162)
Observations 21,897 9,273 20,040 22,115 21,813 21,813
Log likelihood -6,254.28 -612.72 -5,662.25 -3,312.62 -5,489.63 -5,491.17
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Figure 1. Ratio of optimal investment triggers.
Figure 1 plots the ratio of the investment triggers z ≡ X∗B/X∗D as a function of the arrival rate of
informed lenders δ, the bargaining power of shareholders in default η, the size of the growth option
pi, cash flow volatility σ, liquidation costs α, and the arrival rate of competitors λ. Parameter
values are set as in the base case environment.
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Figure 2. Credit lines.
The top 4 panels plot the relative value of equity, defined as the value of equity when using public
debt over the value of equity when using a credit line (i.e. E1(X; c
∗)/E1(X; `∗)), as a function
of the profitability of the growth option pi, the volatility of cash flows σ, the bargaining power of
shareholders in default η, and bankruptcy costs α. The bottom 2 panels the ratio of the investment
triggers z ≡ X∗B/X∗1,` as a function of the arrival rate of informed lenders δ and the bargaining
power of shareholders at the time of investment θ.
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